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Abstract. We present a collision and preimage security analysis of MDC-4, a 24 years old construction for
transforming an n-bit block cipher into a 2n-bit hash function. We start with MDC-4 based on one single
block cipher, and prove that any adversary with query access to the underlying block cipher requires at
least 25n/8 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision. For the preimage resistance, we present a surprising
negative result: for a target image with the same left and right half, a preimage for the full MDC-4 hash
function can be found in 2n queries. Yet, restricted to target images with different left and right halves, we
prove that at least 25n/4 queries (asymptotically) are required to find a preimage. Next, we consider MDC-4
based on two independent block ciphers, a model that is less general but closer to the original design, and
prove that the collision bound of 25n/8 queries and the preimage bound of 25n/4 queries apply to the MDC-4
compression function and hash function design. With these results, we are the first to formally confirm that
MDC-4 offers a higher level of provable security compared to MDC-2.
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1 Introduction
The focus of this work is the classical block cipher based hash function MDC-4. MDC-4 and its related
hash function MDC-2 have first been described by Meyer and Schilling in 1988 [25], and have been
patented by Brachtl et al. in 1990 [4]. MDC-2 has been standardized in ISO/IEC 10118-2 [13] and is
used in numerous applications (see [15, 28] for an exposition), while MDC-4 is part of the IBM CLiC
cryptographic module [6, 7]. In their original specification, MDC-2 and MDC-4 are instantiated using
the block cipher DES. In this work, we step away from this design criterion and consider the designs
based on any block cipher E : Zn2 × Zn2 → Zn2 with key and message length n bits (throughout, the first
input to the block cipher is the key input).
MDC-2 is a Merkle-Damg˚ard (MD) hash function design [5, 24] using a compression function fMDC-2 :
Z3n2 → Z2n2 that internally calls the block cipher E twice. It additionally employs two mappings v and
w, applied on the key inputs to the two block cipher calls. As v and w are originally constructed so as
to have a distinct range1, we can consider MDC-2 to be based on two block ciphers E1(·, ·) = E(v(·), ·)
and E2(·, ·) = E(w(·), ·) [28]. The compression function fMDC-2 : Z3n2 → Z2n2 is defined as follows.
fMDC-2(A,B,C)
W ← E1(A,C)⊕ C, X ← E2(B,C)⊕ C,
Y ←W l‖Xr, Z ← X l‖W r,
return (Y, Z).
Here, for a bit string X of even length we denote by X l and Xr its left and right halves. fMDC-2 can
be considered as a parallel evaluation of two Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) constructions [22] followed
by a swapping of the right halves of both states. Consequently, fMDC-2 does not achieve the desired
level of security: finding a collision or a preimage for fMDC-2 is as hard as finding it for the two MMO
constructions independently, hence requires about 2n/2 or 2n block cipher calls, respectively. For the
full MDC-2 hash function, Knudsen et al. [15] demonstrated that roughly 2n/n block cipher calls suffice
for finding a collision, and about 2n calls for finding a preimage. In 2007, Steinberger derived a non-
trivial security lower bound on MDC-2 [28]. Steinberger considers the MDC-2 hash function using one
single block cipher E modeled as an ideal cipher, and proves that any adversary with query access to
1 The original specification (using block cipher DES) defines v and w as mappings from the ciphertext space to the key
space, where the parity bits are omitted, and the second and third bits are set to 10 and 01, respectively.
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fMDC-4(A,B,C)
S ← E1(A,C)⊕ C,
T ← E2(B,C)⊕ C,
U ← T l‖Sr,
V ← Sl‖T r,
W ← E2(U,A)⊕A,
X ← E1(V,B)⊕B,
Y ← X l‖W r,
Z ←W l‖Xr,
return (Y, Z).
Fig. 1. The fMDC-4 compression function. For convenience, we swapped the left and right block ciphers
of the second fMDC-2 evaluation.
E requires at least 23n/5 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision. His proof relies on the observation
that a collision for MDC-2 implies a collision for the last two rounds of MDC-2, except for some special
cases. These results on MDC-2 are summarized in Table 1; all of these results hold for the case E1 and
E2 are different block ciphers as for the case they are the same.
The MDC-4 hash function differs from MDC-2 in the sense that its underlying compression function
fMDC-4 makes four calls to the underlying block cipher rather than two. fMDC-4 is defined as two
consecutive evaluations of fMDC-2, where the message inputs to the MMO executions in the second
evaluation are B for E1 and A for E2. The definition of fMDC-4 : Z3n2 → Z2n2 is given in Fig. 1. Knudsen
and Preneel [16] showed that approximately 23n/4 block cipher executions suffice to find a collision for
fMDC-4. With respect to preimage resistance, the same authors report that 2
3n/2 calls suffice for finding
a preimage for fMDC-4 and 2
7n/4 calls result in a preimage for MDC-4. The latter result is recently
improved to 23n/2 by Hong and Kwon [12]. These results are summarized in Table 1. In independent
concurrent research, Fleischmann et al. [7, 8] analyzed the collision resistance of MDC-4. They proved
that MDC-4 is collision secure up to approximately 23n/5 queries. Hence, they prove that the bound of
Steinberger for MDC-2 also holds for MDC-4 (in fact, numerically their bound is worse than the bound
on MDC-2). A preimage security lower bound has so far never been derived. Since the introduction of
the functions in [4, 25], however, the MDC-4 hash function has always been considered the more secure
variant of MDC-2. Although mainly a matter of theoretical interest (given that MDC-2 is twice as fast
as MDC-4), formal security lower bounds for MDC-4 or fMDC-4 that confirm this longstanding claim
have never been derived. In particular, for years the MDC-4 structure has not been thoroughly analyzed,
which makes it impossible to classify MDC-4 among other double block length constructions known in
literature (see “Related Work”).
Our Contributions
In this work, we formally analyze the collision and (everywhere) preimage security of MDC-4 and its
underlying fMDC-4 compression function of Fig. 1. We start with considering the general setting where
fMDC-4 is built on one block cipher E = E1 = E2, the single block cipher setting. Then, we consider the
more constrained double block cipher setting, where MDC-4 is based on two independently distributed
ciphers E1 and E2.
Single block cipher setting. A customary approach for proving collision and preimage resistance of a
hash function is to analyze the compression function first and use a preservation result to show that the
findings also apply to the full hash function. However, when the two block ciphers underlying MDC-4
are modeled as one single random block cipher E, collisions and preimages for fMDC-4 can be found in at
most 2n/2 and 2n block cipher calls, respectively: one focuses on state values with the same left and right
Table 1. Known security results for the MDC-2 and MDC-4 compression and hash functions. The security bound gives
a lower bound and the attack bound gives an upper bound on the number of queries in order to find an attack. By “(triv)”
we note that the bound is trivial; these bounds come from the security of the MMO construction [3], or correspond to
generic attacks. The results printed in bold are derived in this work.
collision preimage ideal
primitivessecurity attack security attack
fMDC-2 2
n/2 (triv) 2n/2 (triv) 2n (triv) 2n (triv)
E or (E1, E2)
MDC-2 23n/5 [28] 2n/n [15] 2n (triv) 2n [15]
fMDC-4 2
n/2 (triv) 2n/2 (triv) 2n (triv) 2n (triv)
E
MDC-4 25n/8 2n (triv) 2n (triv) 2n
fMDC-4 2
5n/8 23n/4 [16] 25n/4 23n/2 [16]
(E1, E2)
MDC-4 25n/8 2n (triv) 25n/4 23n/2 [12]
half (for Fig. 1 this means A = B and Y = Z, and consequently S = T , U = V , and W = X), and the
security boils down to the security of two subsequent MMO evaluations. For the preimage resistance,
these type of target images (with Y = Z) can be considered as weak images, these give the adversary
significantly more power. In any case, the security preservation approach does not help us out here, and
instead we consider the security of the MDC-4 hash function design directly.
Starting with collision resistance, we formally prove that any adversary with query access to E,
modeled as an ideal cipher, needs at least 25n/8 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision for MDC-4.
This is beyond the collision bound 23n/5 on MDC-2 by Steinberger [28] and on MDC-4 concurrently
derived by Fleischmann et al. [7, 8]. The proof consists of two parts: given that the initial value of MDC-
4 consists of two different halves, we prove that all intermediate state values of a MDC-4 evaluation
consist of different halves, except with a small probability. Then, it suffices to analyze collision resistance
of fMDC-4 restricted to state values with different left and right halves, which we prove up to at least
25n/8 queries. At the first glance, as fMDC-4 roughly consists of two evaluations of fMDC-2, one is inclined
to say the results of Steinberger [28] directly carry over. However, this is not true due to the differences
at the second fMDC-2 evaluation where the inputs are swapped and the message inputs differ for the left
and right cipher. Instead, we conduct a new collision resistance proof for fMDC-4, and although it shows
some similarities with the proof of Steinberger, it differs in many aspects and uses several new ideas to
facilitate the analysis.
For (everywhere) preimage resistance, we derive a more surprising result, namely that if the target
image (Y,Z) satisfies Y = Z, a preimage for the MDC-4 hash function can be found in approximately
2n queries. The attack resembles ideas from the preimage attack on MDC-2 by Knudsen et al. [15] and
from above-described preimage attack on fMDC-4 in the single block cipher setting. We stress that the
attack does not apply to the original MDC-4 design due to the domain separation by the functions v
and w. On the other hand, if the target image satisfies Y 6= Z, we prove that any adversary requires
at least 25n/4 queries (asymptotically) to find a preimage for fMDC-4 or MDC-4, hence security beyond
the birthday bound is achieved. In order to achieve security beyond 2n queries, we employ the ideas
of free queries and wish lists. These proof tools have been used before by Armknecht et al. and Lee et
al. [2, 21] for compression functions based on two block cipher calls (see “Related Work”), but because
MDC-4 makes four block cipher calls rather than two, and additionally the corresponding wish lists
are much harder to bound, the security proof has become considerably more complex. We remark that
target images with the same left and right half are rather rare, 2n out of 22n target images satisfy
this property. If we had opted for preimage resistance where the challenge is randomly generated, we
obtain in the single block cipher setting a security bound of approximately 25n/4 queries for fMDC-4 and
MDC-4, rather than the bound of 2n queries.
The findings on MDC-4 based on one block cipher E are included in Table 1.
Double block cipher setting. As a second part of this paper, we consider the security of the MDC-4
design where the two block ciphers E1 and E2 are modeled as two independent ideal ciphers. We note
that, despite its more constrained character, this model is closer to the original design due to the domain
separation by the functions v and w.
We show that in this model, any adversary with query access to E1 and E2, needs at least 2
5n/8
queries (asymptotically) to find a collision for fMDC-4 and at least 2
5n/4 queries (asymptotically) to find
a preimage for fMDC-4. These results almost immediately follow from the results in the single block
cipher setting. Note that here we do not make the restriction that the state values should consist of
different halves. Because MDC-4 is a MD transform, it preserves collision and (everywhere) preimage
resistance [1], which means that if the compression function satisfies these security notions, then so does
the hash function. Therefore, these results for fMDC-4 directly carry over to the MDC-4 hash function.
With the 25n/8 collision and 25n/4 preimage security bounds we have formally confirmed the widespread
belief that MDC-4 offers a higher level of security compared to MDC-2. Despite that this security gain
is obtained at the price of efficiency loss, it is an interesting and important result that allows us to make
a fairer comparison among the double block length hash functions and that gives us more insight in the
possibilities and impossibilities of block cipher based hashing. In particular, to our knowledge this is the
first time the preimage resistance of a double block length compression function design with more than
two block cipher evaluations is analyzed. Given that MDC-4 is originally not constructed from a provable
security point of view (but rather an efficiency point of view), more elaborate designs with more than
two block cipher calls may likely offer a higher level of security; our work is a good starting point for
this research direction. Although our findings improve the existing bounds on MDC-4 significantly, large
gaps between the security bounds and the best known attacks remain. A more technical and elaborate
analysis may result in better bounds, and it remains an interesting open problem to improve the security
bounds or the generic attacks for MDC-2 and MDC-4.
Related Work
Closely related to this work are the classical double block length compression functions Abreast-DM and
Tandem-DM [17] and Hirose’s compression function [11], as well as the general compression function
designs by Hirose [10] and O¨zen and Stam [26]. And in fact, these constructions all beat MDC-2 and
MDC-4 with respect to collision and preimage resistance. Each of these constructions is provided with
almost optimal collision security (see Fleischmann et al. [9] and Lee and Kwon [18] for Abreast-DM,
see Lee et al. [20] for Tandem-DM). With respect to preimage resistance, Armknecht et al. and Lee et
al. [2, 21] prove security of Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM and Hirose’s compression function up to almost
22n queries (as mentioned, our preimage resistance proof of MDC-4 employs some proof ideas from
[2, 21]). These double block length constructions, however, all fundamentally differ from MDC-2 and
MDC-4 in the sense that their underlying block ciphers have a double key size, i.e. they use a block
cipher E : Z2n2 × Zn2 → Zn2 that clearly allows for higher compression and that renders a much stronger
underlying assumption. Regarding primitives using an n-bit key block cipher, an interesting design is by
Jetchev et al. [14], who presented a two-call function achieving 22n/3 collision and 2n preimage security.
In [23], Mennink presented a class of compression functions making three block cipher calls with optimal
2n collision security and preimage security up to 23n/2 queries.
Outline
In Sect. 2, we introduce some mathematical background and the security model used in this work. The
security result on the collision resistance of MDC-4 (based on one block cipher E = E1 = E2) is given in
Sect. 3, along with its formal security proof. In Sect. 4, we present our security result on the preimage
resistance of MDC-4 (based on E). In Sect. 5, we discuss the implications of these results to the MDC-4
design based on two block ciphers E1, E2.
2 Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, by Zn2 we denote the set of bit strings of length n. For two bit strings X,Y , by X‖Y we
denote their concatenation and by X ⊕ Y their bitwise XOR. If X is of even length, we denote by X l
and Xr its left and right halves. Throughout, we assume n is even. We denote by Bloc(n) the set of all
block ciphers E : Zn2 × Zn2 → Zn2 , where the first input corresponds to the key input.
An adversary A is a probabilistic algorithm with oracle access to two block ciphers E1, E2 $← Bloc(n)
randomly sampled from Bloc(n) (the security model for the single block cipher setting follows after
straightforward simplifications). We consider the adversary to be information-theoretic, which means
that it has unbounded computational power, and that its complexity is measured by the number of
queries made to its oracles. The adversary can make forward and inverse queries to E1 and E2. The
queries are stored in a query history Q as elements (ki,Ki, xi, yi), where i is the index of the query,
ki ∈ {1, 2} indicates the corresponding block cipher, Ki is the key input, and xi and yi denote the
(plaintext) input and (ciphertext) output of the block cipher. By xi⊕yi, we define its XOR-output. The
index i and the parameter k are omitted if they are irrelevant or clear from the context. For q ≥ 0, by
Qq we define the query history after q queries. We assume that the adversary never makes queries to
which it knows the answer in advance. In this work, we consider two types of adversaries, namely one
that aims at finding collisions and one that aims at finding preimages for fMDC-4.
We say that adversary A finds a collision for fMDC-4 if it obtains a query history Q that al-
lows it to output two distinct tuples (A1, B1, C1), (A2, B2, C2) ∈ Z3n2 such that fMDC-4(A1, B1, C1) =
fMDC-4(A2, B2, C2) and for which Q contains all block cipher queries required to compute the two
evaluations of fMDC-4. We define by
advcolfMDC-4(A) = Pr
(
E1, E2
$← Bloc(n), (A1, B1, C1), (A2, B2, C2)← AEi,E−1i :
(A1, B1, C1) 6= (A2, B2, C2), fMDC-4(A1, B1, C1) = fMDC-4(A2, B2, C2)
)
the probability that A succeeds in finding such query history, and define by advcolfMDC-4(q) the maximum
collision advantage taken over all adversaries making q queries. By adv
col(6=)
fMDC-4
(q) we denote advcolfMDC-4(q)
with the restriction that the state values (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) should satisfy A1 6= B1 and A2 6= B2.
With respect to preimage resistance, we opt for the notion of everywhere preimage resistance [27].
This security notion intuitively guarantees preimage security for every range point. Before making
queries to its oracles, the (preimage finding) adversary A decides on a range point (Y, Z) ∈ Z2n2 . We
say that A finds a preimage for fMDC-4 if it obtains a query history Q that allows it to output a tuple
(A,B,C) ∈ Z3n2 such that fMDC-4(A,B,C) = (Y,Z) and for which Q contains all block cipher queries
required to compute the evaluation of fMDC-4. We define by
adveprefMDC-4(A) = max(Y,Z)∈Z2n2
Pr
(
E1, E2
$← Bloc(n), (A,B,C)← AEi,E−1i (Y,Z) :
fMDC-4(A,B,C) = (Y, Z)
)
the maximum probability that A succeeds in finding such query history, and define by adveprefMDC-4(q) the
maximum (everywhere) preimage advantage taken over all adversaries making q queries. By adv
epre( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q)
we denote adveprefMDC-4(q) restricted to target images (Y,Z) with Y 6= Z.
The security definitions for the full MDC-4 hash function are defined similarly. Here, rather than
tuples from Z3n2 the adversary outputs messages of arbitrary length. Throughout, we denote the initial
state value of MDC-4 by (F0, G0). In the single block cipher setting, we consider one block cipher E
to be generated randomly from Bloc(n) rather than two, and the definitions follow immediately. In the
remainder of this work, it is clear from the context which of the security models we consider.
3 Collision Resistance of MDC-4
We derive a collision security lower bound for MDC-4 in the case the two underlying block ciphers are
identical, i.e. E = E1 = E2. Due to the attack on fMDC-4 (described in Sect. 1), the classical way of
proving collision resistance by ways of property preservation does not work here. Therefore, the security
analysis is done in a slightly different way. Recall that the attack on fMDC-4 relies on the property that
the block cipher evaluations on the left and right sides of Fig. 1 can be the same. The proof is now
roughly divided into two parts: we first prove that, restricted to states with different halves, fMDC-4 is
collision resistant up to at least approximately 25n/8 block cipher queries. Next, we show how this result
can be used to prove collision resistance of the full MDC-4.
Theorem 1. Let n ∈ Zn2 and q < 2n−1. Let t1, t2, t3 > 0 be any integral values. Then,
adv
col( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q) ≤ 2(t1 + 11t1t2 + 3t1t2t3 + 12t2 + 4t
2
2)q
2n
+
2q2
t12n
+ 2 · 2n/2
(
2eq
t22n/2
)t2
+ 2n
(
2eq
t32n
)t3
.
(1)
The proof of Thm. 1 is given in Sect. 3.1. It shows similarities with the proof by Steinberger [28] of
collision resistance of the MDC-2 hash function, but its structure is entirely different so as to facilitate
the proof. The proof is based on using thresholds t1, t2, t3, and (1) holds for any choice of these values.
We elaborate on this threshold approach after Thm. 2.
Employing this result, we now obtain the main result for the collision resistance of MDC-4 using a
single block cipher E.
Theorem 2. Let n ∈ Zn2 and q < 2n−1. Let t1, t2, t3 > 0 be any integral values. Then,
advcolMDC-4(q) ≤
2(2t1 + 11t1t2 + 3t1t2t3 + 14t2 + 5t
2
2)q
2n
+
2q2
t12n
+ 2 · 2n/2
(
2eq
t22n/2
)t2
+ 2n
(
2eq
t32n
)t3
.
(2)
The proof of Thm. 2 is given in Sect. 3.2, and we give a brief intuition. Recall that the attack on fMDC-4
relies on the fact that the two halves of the evaluation can be the same. However, for a full MDC-4
iteration, the initial state value consists of two different halves, and in fact all intermediate state values
consist of two different halves, except with some small probability. Now, by ways of collision resistance
preservation [1], the result of Thm. 1 carries over with as additional term a bound on the probability
that the adversary ends up with a state value with two the same halves.
The proof derived for Thm. 2 (similarly for Thm. 1) is based on using threshold values t1, t2, t3.
This is a proof approach that has for instance been employed in [20, 23, 28]. The intuitive idea of this
approach is to split the “hard” event (finding collisions) into two “less hard” events, where the thresholds
form a balance between the two events: for smaller values of the thresholds, one event happens with a
larger probability and the other one with a smaller probability. Due to this approach, one can divide the
bound of (2) into two parts. The first term forms the first part and increases for increasing parameters
t1, t2, t3. The remaining three terms form the second part that decreases for increasing t1, t2, t3.
Clearly, for naive choices of the values the bound of (2) becomes non-informative: for instance, if
t1 = 1 the term
2q2
2n appears and the bound indicates security up to approximately 2
n/2 queries. However,
(2) holds for all integral values t1, t2, t3 > 0, so we can equivalently state the bound as
advcolMDC-4(q) ≤ min
t1,t2,t3>0
2(2t1 + 11t1t2 + 3t1t2t3 + 14t2 + 5t
2
2)q
2n
+
2q2
t12n
+ 2 · 2n/2
(
2eq
t22n/2
)t2
+ 2n
(
2eq
t32n
)t3
,
where t1, t2, t3 may depend on n. For obtaining a sharp bound, we need to fine tune the integral positive
parameters t1, t2, t3 so that this bound is as low as possible: the trick is to take parameters t1, t2, t3
minimal so that the second part of (2) still goes to 0 for n → ∞. We will show that the advantage
of any adversary making slightly less than 25n/8 queries approaches 0 when n goes to infinity. To this
end, let ε > 0 be any parameter, we consider any adversary making at most q = 25n/8/nε queries to its
oracle. We set t1 = 2
2n/8, t2 = 2
n/8, and t3 = 3. Here, for simplicity we assume t1, t2 to be integral. If
n is no multiple of 8, one sets t1, t2 to the nearest integers. Note that these parameters satisfy t1 >
q2
2n ,
t2 >
q
2n/2
and t3 >
q
2n , which are minimal requirements for the second part of (2) to be < 1. Now, it is
an easy exercise to verify that the bound of (2) approaches 0 for n→∞ when q = 25n/8/nε and t1, t2, t3
are as specified.
Corollary 1. For any ε > 0, we obtain limn→∞ advcolMDC-4
(
25n/8/nε
)
= 0.
The result means that for n→∞ the function advcolMDC-4 behaves as q8/25n. A graphical representation of
advcolMDC-4 for n = 128 is given in Fig. 2. In this graph, where we have slightly adjusted the parameters
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Fig. 2. The function advcolMDC-4(q) of (2) for n = 128, in comparison with the trivial bound q(q + 1)/2
n
(dashed line).
t1, t2 to facilitate the analysis for smaller n and smaller q (the previously chosen values were set to
analyze limiting behavior for n, q), we see an improvement over the best known bound and the bound
independently derived in [7, 8]. For n = 128 the collision resistance advantage hits 1/2 for log2 q ≈ 77.5,
which is smaller than the threshold for q8/25n, 79.9. For larger values of n, by Cor. 1 the difference goes
to 0 for n→∞.
3.1 Proof of Thm. 1
The collision resistance proof shows some similarities with the proof of Steinberger for MDC-2 [28], but
fundamentally differs in various aspects and is as such of independent interest. In particular, due to a
different and more structured case distinction we obtain a sharper bound (security up to 25n/8 queries)
than the bound of Steinberger for MDC-2 (security up to 23n/5 queries). Also, our proof improves over
the proof by Fleischmann et al. [7, 8], who basically confirmed that the 23n/5 bound of MDC-2 applies
to MDC-4 too.
We consider any adversary making q queries to its oracle E, which tries to find a collision for fMDC-4.
Finding a collision corresponds to obtaining a query history Qq of size q that satisfies configuration
col(Qq) of Fig. 3. In other words,
adv
col( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q) = Pr (col(Qq)) , (3)
and we consider the probability of obtaining any query history Qq that satisfies configuration col(Qq).
Notice that in this configuration, we omit the shifting at the end: as this shifting is bijective, it does not
influence the collision finding advantage. In Fig. 3, as well as in all subsequent figures in this section,
we label the block ciphers as follows to uniquely identify their positions. In the left word of Fig. 3 (with
inputs (A1, B1, C1)) the block ciphers are labeled 1tl, 1tr, 1bl, 1br, for top/bottom left/right. For the
right word the block ciphers are identified as 2tl, 2tr, 2bl, 2br. In the remainder, when talking about
“a query 1tl”, we mean “a query that in a collision occurs at position 1tl” (and the same for the other
positions). The capitalized variables in the figures may take any value, and are simply used to accentuate
relations among the two words.
We need to evaluate the probability of the adversary finding a query history Qq that satisfies con-
figuration col(Qq) of Fig. 3. For this analysis we introduce a helping event help(Qq). Let t1, t2, t3 > 0 be
integral. Event help(Qq) is satisfied if either of the following sub-events helpk(Qq) (k = 1, . . . , 4) occurs.
help1(Qq) :
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi), (Kj , xj , yj) ∈ Qq ∣∣ i 6= j ∧ xi ⊕ yi = xj ⊕ yj}∣∣ > t1;
help2(Qq) : maxz∈Zn/22
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi) ∈ Qq ∣∣ (xi ⊕ yi)l = z}∣∣ > t2;
help3(Qq) : maxz∈Zn/22
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi) ∈ Qq ∣∣ (xi ⊕ yi)r = z}∣∣ > t2;
help4(Qq) : maxz∈Zn2
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi) ∈ Qq ∣∣ xi ⊕ yi = z}∣∣ > t3.
1 colQ-left
A1 B1C1
Y Z
2 colQ-right
A2 B2C2
Y Z
Fig. 3. Configuration col(Q). We require (A1, B1, C1) 6= (A2, B2, C2), A1 6= B1, and A2 6= B2.
By basic probability theory, we obtain for (3):
Pr (col(Qq)) ≤ Pr (col(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) + Pr (help(Qq)) . (4)
For the analysis of the event col(Qq), it may be the case that a single query occurs at multiple positions
in the configuration. Therefore, we divide col(Qq) into sub-configurations. For two distinct positions
a, b ∈ {1tl, 1tr, 1bl, 1br, 2tl, 2tr, 2bl, 2br} and a binary value α ∈ {0, 1}, by a = b ≡ α we say that the same
query occurs at both positions a and b if and only if α = 1. Now, we define for αtl, αtr, αbl, αbr ∈ {0, 1}
the sub-configuration colαtlαtrαblαbr(Q) as col(Q) of Fig. 3 with the restriction that
1tl = 2tl ≡ αtl, 1tr = 2tr ≡ αtr, 1bl = 2bl ≡ αbl, 1br = 2br ≡ αbr.
Clearly,
col(Qq)⇒
∨
αtl,αtr,αbl,
αbr∈{0,1}
colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq). (5)
It may be the case that the same query occurs at positions 1tl and 1br or 2br, but as becomes clear
these cases are included in the analysis. By (3-5), we obtain the following bound on adv
col( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q):
adv
col( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q) ≤
∑
αtl,αtr,αbl,
αbr∈{0,1}
Pr (colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) + Pr (help(Qq)) . (6)
The probabilities constituting to the sum of (6) are analyzed in Lems. 1-6 as further set forth in Table
2. Probability Pr (help(Qq)) is analyzed in Lem. 7. In this section we only include the proof of Lem. 1.
The proofs of Lems. 2-7 are given in App. A.
Table 2. For αtl, αtr, αbl, αbr ∈ {0, 1}, the probability bound on colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq) (cf. (6))
is analyzed in the corresponding lemma.
αtlαtrαblαbr 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111
Lemma 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 6 4 6 5 6 6 6 6 6
Lemma 1. Pr (col0000(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ (t1t2t3+t1t2+2t2)q2n−q .
Proof. A visualization of configuration col0000(Qq) can be found in Fig. 4. In this figure, the queries
corresponding to locations a and !a are required to be different, and the same for the queries at positions
(b, !b), (c, !c) and (d, !d). For the analysis of col0000(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq), we say that the i-th query (i ∈
{1, . . . , q}) is successful if it makes configuration col0000(Qi) satisfied and ¬help(Qi) holds. Now, by
basic probability theory, we can analyze the probability of the i-th query being successful, and sum over
i = 1, . . . , q.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. We will analyze the probability of the i-th query to be successful, i.e. to satisfy
col0000(Qi) ∧ ¬help(Qi). If help(Qi) holds, the i-th query can certainly not be successful, so we assume
¬help(Qi) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes col0000(Qi) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs in the left word. It may be the case
that the i-th query also occurs in the right word (e.g. at 2br), but as becomes clear from the proof, this
case is automatically included. Note that, as A1 6= B1, it can impossibly occur at (1tl, 1tr) or (1bl, 1br).
Therefore, without loss of generality (by symmetry) it suffices to analyze the cases the query occurs at
the following positions: 1tl only, 1br only, (1tl, 1br) only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these
four cases.
Query occurs at 1tl only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for queries at positions (1br, 2br)
(we note that the query at 2br may equal the i-th query, but this does not invalidate the ongoing
analysis). For any of these ≤ t1 choices, let K1br and K2br be the key inputs corresponding to positions
1br and 2br. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tl, the query at
position 2tr and consequently the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined (if they exist at all), and
so is the XOR-output Y of 2bl. By ¬help4(Qi), there are ≤ t3 choices for 1bl. For any of these ≤ t1t2t3
choices 1bl, let K1bl be the key input corresponding to position 1bl. The i-th query is successful only if
its XOR-output equals K l1br‖Kr1bl, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total probability
is at most t1t2t32n−q .
Query occurs at 1br only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these
≤ t1 choices, let K2bl be the key input corresponding to position 2bl. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2
choices for 2tr. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tr, the query at position 2tl and consequently the query
at position 2br is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Z of 2br. The i-th query is successful
only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total
success probability is at most t1t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1tl and 1br only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require K l = Z l, which fixes Z l. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2br. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2br, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require Kr = Y r, which fixes Y r. By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2bl. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
The i-th query is successful with probability at most t1t2t3+t1t2+2t22n−q . The claimed bound is obtained by
summing over i = 1, . . . , q. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Pr (colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ (2t1t2+2t2+t
2
2)q
2n−q for αtlαtrαblαbr ∈ {0001, 0010}.
Lemma 3. Pr (col0011(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ t1q2n−q .
Lemma 4. Pr (colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ (t1t2t3+2t1t2+2t2)q2n−q for αtlαtrαblαbr ∈ {0100, 1000}.
Lemma 5. Pr (colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ (t1t2+t2+t
2
2)q
2n−q for αtlαtrαblαbr ∈ {0101, 1010}.
Lemma 6. Pr (colαtlαtrαblαbr(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) = 0 for αtlαtrαblαbr ∈ {11 ∗ ∗, 1 ∗ ∗1, ∗11∗}.
Lemma 7. Pr (help(Qq)) ≤ q2t1(2n−q) + 2 · 2n/2
(
eq2n/2
t2(2n−q)
)t2
+ 2n
(
eq
t3(2n−q)
)t3
.
3 colQ0000-left
A1 B1C1
Y Z
a b
c d
4 colQ0000-right
A2 B2C2
Y Z
!a !b
!c !d
Fig. 4. Configuration col0000(Q) of Lem. 1. We require (A1, B1, C1) 6= (A2, B2, C2), A1 6= B1, and
A2 6= B2.
We are ready to finish the proof of Thm. 1. Lemmas 1-7 imply for adv
col( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q) of (6):
adv
col( 6=)
fMDC-4
(q) ≤ (t1 + 11t1t2 + 3t1t2t3 + 12t2 + 4t
2
2)q
2n − q +
q2
t1(2n − q) +
2 · 2n/2
(
eq2n/2
t2(2n − q)
)t2
+ 2n
(
eq
t3(2n − q)
)t3
,
where t1, t2, t3 > 0 are integral. The result of Thm. 1 is obtained by observing that 2
n − q > 2n−1 for
q < 2n−1.
3.2 Proof of Thm. 2
As explained in Sect. 3 we essentially only need to consider the probability that an adversary finds an
fMDC-4 evaluation where the state consists of two different halves and the output state consists of two
the same halves. The formal treatment of this is more elaborate.
We consider any adversary making q queries to its oracle E, which tries to find a collision for MDC-4.
Denote by (F0, G0) the initial state value of MDC-4, where F0 6= G0. Suppose the adversary finds a
collision, i.e. two lists
(F0, G0)
m1−−→ (F1, G1) m2−−→ · · · mk−−→ (Fk, Gk),
(F0, G0)
m′1−−→ (F ′1, G′1)
m′2−−→ · · · m
′
k−−→ (F ′k′ , G′k′)
of internal state values of the two evaluations, where k, k′ ≥ 1 and (Fk, Gk) = (F ′k′ , G′k′). The collision
is non-trivial if k 6= k′ or if (Fi, Gi,mi) 6= (F ′i , G′i,m′i) for some i = 1, . . . , k = k′, and we consider
non-trivial collisions only. If the adversary finds a collision of this form, we can distinguish between the
following two cases:
(1) Fi 6= Gi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and F ′i 6= G′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k′};
(2) Fi = Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} or F ′i = G′i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k′}.
Suppose the adversary finds a collision in case (1). This implies (by basic collision security preservation
[1]) the adversary necessarily needs to obtain a query history Qq of size q that satisfies configuration
col(Qq) of Fig. 3.
On the other hand, suppose the adversary finds a collision in case (2). Without loss of generality,
a state-half collision occurs in the first word. As F0 6= G0, there exists an i such that Fi = Gi but
Fi−1 6= Gi−1. This means that in this case the adversary necessarily needs to obtain a query history
Qq of size q that satisfies configuration statecol(Qq) of Fig. 5. Here, Z represents Fi = Gi and (A,B)
represents (Fi−1, Gi−1). As in Sect. 3.1, in this configuration we have omitted the shifting at the end.
We stress that this does not harm the security analysis. We label the block ciphers tl, . . . , br.
15 statecolQ
A B
C
Z Z
Fig. 5. Configuration statecol(Q). We require A 6= B.
Concluding, we find
advcolMDC-4(q) ≤ Pr (col(Qq) ∨ statecol(Qq)) . (7)
We employ the helping event help(Qq) from Sect. 3.1, and obtain for (7):
Pr (col(Qq) ∨ statecol(Qq)) ≤ Pr (col(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) + Pr (help(Qq)) +
Pr (statecol(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) . (8)
For the first two probabilities, the proof of Thm. 1 applies. The probability bound on statecol(Qq) ∧
¬help(Qq) is analyzed in Lem. 8.
Lemma 8. Pr (statecol(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ (t1+2t2+t
2
2)q
2n−q .
Proof. We consider configuration statecol(Qq) of Fig. 5. The proof idea is the same as the proof of
Lem. 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Qi) and analyze the probability the i-th
query makes statecol(Qi) satisfied.
Recall that the positions in Fig. 5 are simply referred to as tl, tr, bl, br, without a leading 1. Without
loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: tl only, bl only, (tl, br)
only, or (tl, bl) only. Note that, as A 6= B, it can impossibly occur at (tl, tr) or (bl, br).
Query occurs at tl only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (bl, br). For any of these ≤ t1
choices, let Kbl and Kbr be the key inputs corresponding to positions bl and br. The i-th query is
successful only if its XOR-output equals K lbr‖Krbl, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The
total success probability is at most t12n−q .
Query occurs at bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. By ¬help2(Qi) and ¬help3(Qi),
there are ≤ t2 choices for tl and ≤ t2 choices for tr. For any of these ≤ t22 choices, the query at position br
is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Z of br. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-
output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability
is at most
t22
2n−q .
Query occurs at tl and br only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require K l = Z l, which fixes Z l. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for bl. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
Query occurs at tl and bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require Kr = Zr, which fixes Zr. By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for br. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices br, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
The i-th query is successful with probability at most
t1+2t2+t22
2n−q . The claimed bound is obtained by
summing over i = 1, . . . , q. uunionsq
We are ready to finish the proof of Thm. 2. The findings of Sect. 3.1 and Lem.8 imply for (8):
advcolMDC-4(q) ≤
(2t1 + 11t1t2 + 3t1t2t3 + 14t2 + 5t
2
2)q
2n − q +
(t1 + 2t2 + t
2
2)q
2n − q +
q2
t1(2n − q) + 2 · 2
n/2
(
eq2n/2
t2(2n − q)
)t2
+ 2n
(
eq
t3(2n − q)
)t3
,
where t1, t2, t3 > 0 are integral. The result of Thm. 2 is obtained by observing that 2
n − q > 2n−1 for
q < 2n−1.
4 Preimage Resistance of MDC-4
We analyze the preimage security of MDC-4 in the case the two underlying block ciphers are identical,
i.e. E = E1 = E2. Let (Y, Z) be the target image. We distinguish between Y = Z and Y 6= Z.
Y = Z. If the two halves of the image are the same, a preimage for the compression function fMDC-4
can be found in about 2n queries (cf. Sect. 1): one focuses on preimages with the same left and right
halves A = B, in which case it suffices to find A,C such that
E(E(A,C)⊕ C,A)⊕A = Y = Z.
We demonstrate that this weakness propagates through the iteration of the MDC-4 hash function,
resulting in an everywhere preimage attack for the MDC-4 hash function in 2n queries (on average). We
recall that everywhere preimage resistance is defined as the maximum advantage over all images, thus
including the weak images consisting of two identical halves. If we had opted for preimage resistance
where the challenge is randomly generated, this preimage attack succeeds only with small probability
as 2n out of 22n target images are weak.
The attack uses ideas from Knudsen et al. [15] to find preimages for MDC-2. It is a meet-in-the-
middle attack and at a high level works as follows. First, one constructs a tree with 2n leaves with root
(Y, Z). The edges in this tree correspond to evaluations of fMDC-4. In the general case, the construction
of this tree requires the adversary to find approximately 2n+1 preimages, but as turns out for fMDC-4
the workload is significantly lower. Then, starting from the initial value (F0, G0), one varies the message
input C to hit any of the 2n leaves. In more detail, the attack works as follows:
1. Fix any m0,m1 ∈ Zn2 such that X‖mb is a correct padding for any X ∈ Zn·n2 and b ∈ {0, 1};2
2. For b = 0, 1 operate as follows. For any A ∈ Zn2 query V ← E(A,mb) and W ← E(V ⊕mb, A). These
queries correspond to the evaluation fMDC-4(A,A,mb) = (W ⊕ A,W ⊕ A). Add the input-output
tuple ((A,A); (W ⊕A,W ⊕A)) to a list Lb;
3. Let (Z,Z) be the target image. On average, this item occurs once in each list L0, L1, which results in
two fMDC-4 preimages for (Z,Z). It may result in more than two fMDC-4 preimages if (Z,Z) occurs
multiple times in one of the lists. The same procedure can be iteratively executed for all resulting
preimages, until a tree of approximately 2n leaves is formed, with from each leave a path of n edges
to (Z,Z);3
4. Starting from initial value (F0, G0), vary m until fMDC-4(F0, G0,m) hits any of the 2
n leaves.
Step 1 requires 2n+2 block cipher queries. Step 4 is a brute force attack and requires approximately
4 · (22n/2n) evaluations of E. In total, this attack requires approximately 2n+3 queries. The attack has
time and space complexity O(2n).
Y 6= Z. For the everywhere preimage resistance of the fMDC-4 compression function of Fig. 1 with the
restriction that Y 6= Z, we derive the following results. The findings directly carry over to MDC-4 as it
is a MD transform, which preserves everywhere preimage resistance [1].
2 We assume the padding takes less than n bits.
3 Due to collisions in the lists L0, L1, the amount of 2
n will usually not be reached. Elaborate statistical analysis shows
that the average number of leaves at distance n from the root (Z,Z) varies between 2n−1 and 2n.
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Preimage Resistance
Fig. 6. The function adv
epre(6=)
fMDC-4
(q) of (9) for n = 128, in comparison with the best known bound q/2n
(dashed line).
Theorem 3. Let n ∈ Zn2 . Let t1, t2 > 0 be any integral values with t1 ≤ q. Then, provided the image
(Y, Z) satisfies Y 6= Z,
adv
epre(6=)
fMDC-4
(q) ≤ 4t
3
2 + 4t1t2 + 20 + 4 · 2n/2
2n
+
16t1t2 + 24t1t22
n/2
22n
+
64q
23n
+
2 · 2n/2
(
4eq
t12n/2
)t1/2
+
4q
2n/2
(
8eq
t12n/2
) t12n
4q
+ 2n
(
4eq
t22n
)t2/2
+ 2q
(
8eq
t22n
) t22n
4q
. (9)
The proof of Thm. 3 is given in Sect. 4.1. It employs ideas of the preimage resistance proof by Armknecht
et al. [2] and Lee et al. [19, 21] for double block length compression functions, namely the issuance of
free queries and the usage of wish lists. However, the analysis has become considerably more complex
because the MDC-4 compression function uses four block ciphers rather than two, and consequently the
derivation of bounds on the sizes of the wish lists has become more elaborate.
The bound of (9) can be analyzed in a similar manner as is done in Sect. 3, and we skip the details.
Let ε > 0 be any parameter, we consider any adversary making at most q = 25n/4/nε queries to its
oracle. We set t1 = 2
3n/4 and t2 = 2
n/4/nε/2. Again, t1, t2 are assumed to be integral. Note that for
interesting values of ε, we have t1 ≤ q as desired. As before, it immediately follows that the bound of
(9) approaches 0 for n→∞ when q = 25n/4/nε and t1, t2 are as specified.
Corollary 2. For any ε > 0, we obtain limn→∞ adv
epre(6=)
fMDC-4
(
25n/4/nε
)
= 0.
The result means that for n→∞ the function advepre(6=)fMDC-4 (as well as adv
epre(6=)
MDC-4 by preimage resistance
preservation) behaves as q4/25n. a graphical representation of adv
epre( 6=)
fMDC-4
for n = 128 is given in Fig. 6.
As in the case of Sect. 3, we have slightly adjusted the parameters t1, t2 to facilitate the analysis for
smaller n and smaller q. For n = 128 the preimage resistance advantage hits 1/2 for log2 q ≈ 151.9. Also
in this case, the gap between this value and threshold for q4/25n, 159.75, is caused by the choice for
small n. By Cor. 2 the difference goes to 0 for n→∞.
4.1 Proof of Thm. 3
We consider any adversary making q queries to its oracle E, which tries to find a preimage for fMDC-4.
Let (Y,Z) ∈ Z2n2 be the point to invert, chosen by the adversary prior to making any query. Finding
a preimage for (Y,Z) corresponds to obtaining a query history Qq of size q that satisfies configuration
pre(Qq) of Fig. 7. In other words,
adv
epre(6=)
fMDC-4
(q) = Pr (pre(Qq)) , (10)
and we consider the probability of obtaining any query history Qq that satisfies configuration pre(Qq).
As is done in Sect. 3.1, we again omit the bijective shifting at the end as it does not influence the
preimage security. We use the same convention for the figures as is used in Sect. 3.1, with the difference
that in Fig. 7 the variables Y, Z are underlined to denote that these are fixed. As we only consider one
word (rather than two, in Sect. 3.1), we label the block ciphers simply as tl, tr, bl, br for top/bottom
left/right.
1 preQ
A B
C
Y Z
Fig. 7. Configuration pre(Q). We have Y 6= Z.
The analysis in this section relies on the issuance of free super queries [2, 19, 21]. If the adversary
has made 2n−1 queries to E under the same key, it will receive the remaining 2n−1 queries for this key
for free. As in [2, 21], we call this query a super query. Formally, these free queries can be modeled as
queries the adversary is forced to make, but at no charge. For convenience, we use Qq to denote the
query history after q normal queries. This query history thus contains all normal queries plus all super
queries made so far. A super query is a set of 2n−1 single queries, and any query in the query history is
either a normal query or a part of a super query, but not both. Notice that the adversary needs 2n−1
queries as preparatory work to enforce a super query. As the adversary makes at most q queries, at most
q/2n−1 super queries will occur.
For the analysis of pre(Qq), we introduce a helping event help(Qq). Let t1, t2 > 0 be integral. Event
help(Qq) is satisfied if either of the following sub-events helpk(Qq) (k = 1, 2, 3) occurs.
help1(Qq) : maxz∈Zn/22
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi) ∈ Qq ∣∣ (xi ⊕ yi)l = z}∣∣ > t1;
help2(Qq) : maxz∈Zn/22
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi) ∈ Qq ∣∣ (xi ⊕ yi)r = z}∣∣ > t1;
help3(Qq) : maxz∈Zn2
∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi) ∈ Qq ∣∣ xi ⊕ yi = z}∣∣ > t2.
These helping events are the same as the ones used in the proof of collision resistance in Sect. 3.1, but
are reintroduced for simplicity. Note that help3(Qq) particularly covers the values Y, Z as XOR-outputs.
By basic probability theory, we obtain for (10):
Pr (pre(Qq)) ≤ Pr (pre(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) + Pr (help(Qq)) . (11)
In Lem. 9, we bound Pr (pre(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) and probability Pr (help(Qq)) is analyzed in Lem. 10.
The proofs are given in App. B.
Lemma 9. Pr (pre(Qq) ∧ ¬help(Qq)) ≤ 4t
3
2+4t1t2+20+4·2n/2
2n +
16t1t2+24t1t22n/2
22n
+ 64q
23n
.
Lemma 10. Provided t1 ≤ q, we have
Pr (help(Qq)) ≤ 2 · 2n/2
(
4eq
t12n/2
)t1/2
+
4q
2n/2
(
8eq
t12n/2
) t12n
4q
+ 2n
(
4eq
t22n
)t2/2
+ 2q
(
8eq
t22n
) t22n
4q
.
With respect to Lem. 10, we note that help3(Q) is similar to the event Lucky(Q) analyzed by Armknecht
et al. [2] and Lee et al. [21]: the only difference is that help3(Q) is required to hold for any z ∈ Zn2 . In
their analysis of Lucky(Q), [2, 21] make a distinction between the normal and super queries (just as we
do in the proof of Lem. 10) but for the super queries their analysis is based on Markov’s inequality and
is consequently much simpler. However, because our helping events are required to hold for any z ∈ Zn2
(event help3(Q)) and for any z ∈ Zn/22 (event help1∨2(Q)), a similar approach using Markov’s inequality
would result in a trivial bound and a more elaborate treatment was required.
The proof of Thm. 3 is finished by adding the bounds of Lems. 9-10, as set forth in (10-11).
5 Security of MDC-4 with Two Distinct Block Ciphers E1, E2
We consider the collision and preimage resistance of MDC-4 in the setting where the two block ciphers
E1, E2 are independently distributed. Although the analysis of MDC-4 with one block cipher is more
general, the MDC-4 mode of operation with two independent block cipher is much closer to the original
design due to the domain separation by the functions v and w (see Sect. 1). In this setting, the following
results can be obtained by straightforward simplifications of the proofs of Thms. 1 and 3.
Starting with collision resistance, we obtain the following results. They directly carry over to MDC-4
as it is a MD transform, which preserves collision resistance [1]. We stress that we pose no limitation
on the state values.
Theorem 4. Let n ∈ Zn2 and q < 2n−1. Let t1, t2, t3 > 0 be any integral values. Then,
advcolfMDC-4(q) ≤
2(t1 + 7t1t2 + 3t1t2t3 + 5t2 + 4t
2
2)q
2n
+
2q2
t12n
+ 2 · 2n/2
(
2eq
t22n/2
)t2
+ 2n
(
2eq
t32n
)t3
. (12)
In the proof of Thm. 1, the restrictions A1 6= B1 and A2 6= B2 are essentially used to guarantee
that the queries occurring at positions (1tl, 1tr) are distinct, and so are the ones at (1bl, 1br). But as,
regarding Thm. 4, E1, E2 are independently distributed this is directly guaranteed. The bound of Thm. 4
immediately follows by leaving out some cases in the proof of Thm. 1 (such as for col0000(Qq) the case
that the last query appears at (1tl, 1bl)). By a similar reasoning as before, Cor. 1 applies to advcolfMDC-4(q)
too.
By the same arguments, we find the following bound on the preimage resistance. Corollary 2 applies
to adveprefMDC-4(q) too. The results directly carry over to MDC-4 as it is a MD transform, which preserves
everywhere preimage resistance [1].
Theorem 5. Let n ∈ Zn2 . Let t1, t2 > 0 be any integral values with t1 ≤ q. Then,
adveprefMDC-4(q) ≤
4t32 + 4t1t2
2n
+
16t1t2
22n
+
8
2n
+ 2 · 2n/2
(
4eq
t12n/2
)t1/2
+
4q
2n/2
(
8eq
t12n/2
) t12n
4q
+ 2n
(
4eq
t22n
)t2/2
+ 2q
(
8eq
t22n
) t22n
4q
. (13)
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A Appendix to Sect. 3.1: Proofs of Lems. 2-7
In this appendix, we prove Lems. 2-7 of Sect. 3.1. The proofs of Lems. 2-6 are supported by Figs. 8-11,
and for these figures the same convention is used as for Fig. 4. In particular, the queries corresponding
to locations a and !a are required to be different, and the same for the queries at positions (b, !b) and
(c, !c).
A.1 Proof of Lem. 2
The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider col0001(Qq) only. A visualization of configuration
col0001(Qq) can be found in Fig. 8. For the basic proof idea, we refer to the proof of Lem. 1. Let
5 colQ0001-left
A1 BC1
X Y
Z
a b
c
6 colQ0001-right
A2 BC2
X Y
Z
!a !b
!c
Fig. 8. Configuration col0001(Q) of Lem. 2. We
require (A1, C1) 6= (A2, C2), A1 6= B, and A2 6=
B.
9 colQ0011mid-left
A B
C1
Y Z
a b
10 colQ0011mid-right
A B
C2
Y Z
!a !b
Fig. 9. Configuration col0011(Q) of Lem. 3. We
require C1 6= C2 and A 6= B.
11 colQ0100-left
A1
B
C
W X
Y Z
a
b c
12 colQ0100-right
A2
B
C
W X
Y Z
!a
!b !c
Fig. 10. Configuration col0100(Q) of Lem. 4. We
require A1 6= A2, A1 6= B, and A2 6= B.
13 colQ0101-left
A1
C
X
Y
Z
a
b
14 colQ0101-right
A2
C
X
Y
Z
!a
!b
Fig. 11. Configuration col0101(Q) of Lem. 5. We
require A1 6= A2.
i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Qi) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes
col0001(Qi) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only,
1tr only, 1bl only, (1tr, 1bl) only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these five cases. Note that, as
A1 6= B, it can impossibly occur at (1tl, 1tr). It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the
right word, but this case is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these
≤ t1 choices, let K1bl and K2bl be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1bl and 2bl. By ¬help3(Qi),
there are ≤ t2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tl, we obtain a different X. The i-th query
is successful only if its XOR-output equals X‖Kr1bl, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The
total success probability is at most t1t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1tr only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these
≤ t1 choices, let K1bl and K2bl be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1bl and 2bl. By ¬help2(Qi),
there are ≤ t2 choices for 2tr. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tr, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query
is successful only if its XOR-output equals K l1bl‖Y , which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The
total success probability is at most t1t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1bl only: inverse query x← E−1(K, y). By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices
for 1tl. For any of these ≤ t2 choices, let K1tl be the key input corresponding to position 1tl. The i-th
query is successful only if x = K1tl, which happens with probability at most
1
2n−q . The total success
probability is at most t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1bl only: forward query y ← E(K,x). By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices
for 1tr. For any of these ≤ t2 choices 1tr, the query at position 1tl is uniquely determined (it requires
key input x and message input C1 defined by query 1tr), and so are the strings (B,X). By ¬help2(Qi),
there are ≤ t2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t22 choices 2tl, the query at position 2tr is uniquely
determined (it requires key input B and message input C2 defined by query 2tl). Consequently, the
query at position 2br is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Z of 2br. The i-th query is
successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q .
The total success probability is at most
t22
2n−q .
Query occurs at 1tr and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require K l = Z l, which fixes Z l. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2bl. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require Kr = Zr, which fixes Zr. By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2bl. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
The i-th query is successful with probability at most
2t1t2+2t2+t22
2n−q . The claimed bound is obtained by
summing over i = 1, . . . , q.
A.2 Proof of Lem. 3
A visualization of configuration col0011(Qq) can be found in Fig. 9. For the basic proof idea, we refer to
the proof of Lem. 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Qi) and analyze the probability
the i-th query makes col0011(Qi) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the position 1tl only. Note that, as
A 6= B, it can impossibly occur at (1tl, 1tr). It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the
right word, but these cases is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1tr, 2tr). For any of these ≤ t1
choices, as A is fixed (it equals the key input for the i-th query) the query at position 2tl is uniquely
determined, and so is the XOR-output Y of 2tl. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t12n−q .
The i-th query is successful with probability at most t12n−q . The claimed bound is obtained by summing
over i = 1, . . . , q.
A.3 Proof of Lem. 4
The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider col0100(Qq) only. A visualization of configuration
col0100(Qq) can be found in Fig. 10. For the basic proof idea, we refer to the proof of Lem. 1. Let
i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Qi) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes
col0100(Qi) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only,
1bl only, 1br only, (1tl, 1br) only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these five cases. Note that, as
A1 6= B, it can impossibly occur at (1bl, 1br). It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the
right word, but this case is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl only. We note that the query at position 1tr = 2tr is not depicted in Fig. 10
but is defined as a query (2, B,C,W‖X ⊕ C). By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for queries at
positions (1br, 2br). For any of these ≤ t1 choices, let K1br and K2br be the key inputs corresponding to
positions 1br and 2br. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tl,
the query at position 1tr = 2tr and consequently the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined, and
so is the XOR-output Y of 2bl. By ¬help4(Qi), there are ≤ t3 choices for 1bl. For any of these ≤ t1t2t3
choices 1bl, let K1bl be the key input corresponding to position 1bl. The i-th query is successful only if
its XOR-output equals K l1br‖Kr1bl, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total probability
is at most t1t2t32n−q .
Query occurs at 1bl only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1br, 2br). For any of these
≤ t1 choices, let K2br be the key input corresponding to position 2br. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2
choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tl, the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined, and
so is the XOR-output Y of 2bl. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Y ,
which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at most
t1t2
2n−q .
Query occurs at 1br only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these ≤ t1
choices, let K2bl be the key input corresponding to position 2bl. By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for
2tl. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tl, the key input to the query at position 2br, say K2br, is uniquely
determined. Suppose the i-th query is a forward query y ← E(K,x) (exactly the same reasoning applies
to inverse queries). If K2br = K, the queries at positions 1br and 2br must be the same and the collision
is invalid. Therefore, we assume K2br 6= K. For the key K2br, let (K2br, x2br, y2br) be any query in the
query history. The i-th query makes the configuration satisfied if x2br = x and x2br ⊕ y2br = x ⊕ y, or
more concretely if
x2br = x and y2br = y. (14)
This means that, irrespectively of whether the i-th query is a forward or inverse query, the query at
position 2br is uniquely determined. The i-th query is successful only if it satisfies (14), which happens
with probability at most 12n−q . The total probability is at most
t1t2
2n−q .
Query occurs at 1tl and 1br only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require K l = Z l, which fixes Z l. By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2br. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2br, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require Kr = Y r, which fixes Y r. By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2bl. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
The i-th query is successful with probability at most t1t2t3+2t1t2+2t22n−q . The claimed bound is obtained by
summing over i = 1, . . . , q.
A.4 Proof of Lem. 5
The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider col0101(Qq) only. A visualization of configuration
col0101(Qq) can be found in Fig. 11. For the basic proof idea, we refer to the proof of Lem. 1. Let
i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Qi) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes
col0101(Qi) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only, 1bl
only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these three cases. It may be the case that the i-th query
also occurs in the right word, but this case is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl only. By ¬help1(Qi), there are ≤ t1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these
≤ t1 choices, let K1bl and K2bl be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1bl and 2bl. By ¬help3(Qi),
there are ≤ t2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t1t2 choices 2tl, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query
is successful only if its XOR-output equals Y ‖Kr1bl, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The
total success probability is at most t1t22n−q .
Query occurs at 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. By ¬help3(Qi), there are
≤ t2 choices for 1tl. For any of these ≤ t2 choices, we obtain a different Y . By ¬help2(Qi), there are ≤ t2
choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t22 choices 2tl, the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined, and
so is the XOR-output Z of 2bl. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z,
which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at most
t22
2n−q .
Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs
at both positions, we require Kr = Zr, which fixes Zr. By ¬help3(Qi), there are ≤ t2 choices for 2bl. For
any of these ≤ t2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output
equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 12n−q . The total success probability is at
most t22n−q .
The i-th query is successful with probability at most
t1t2+t2+t22
2n−q . The claimed bound is obtained by
summing over i = 1, . . . , q.
A.5 Proof of Lem. 6
If 1tl = 2tl and 1tr = 2tr, we obtain (A1, B1, C1) = (A2, B2, C2) in the configuration of Fig. 3, and the
collision is invalid. The same observation applies if (1tl, 1br) = (2tl, 2br) or (1tr, 1bl) = (2tr, 2bl).
A.6 Proof of Lem. 7
It suffices to consider the events Pr (helpk(Qq)) (k = 1, . . . , 4) separately.
help1(Qq). We copy the approach of Steinberger [28]. For i 6= j, the two queries (Ki, xi, yi) and (Kj , xj , yi)
have the same XOR-output with probability at most 12n−q . Hence, the expected value E(xi⊕yi = xj⊕yj)
is at most 12n−q , and consequently
E
(∣∣{(Ki, xi, yi), (Kj , xj , yj) ∈ Qq ∣∣ i 6= j ∧ xi ⊕ yi = xj ⊕ yj}∣∣) ≤∑
i 6=j
1
2n − q ≤
q2
2n − q .
By Markov’s inequality, we obtain
Pr (help1(Qq)) ≤
q2
t1(2n − q) . (15)
helpk(Qq) for k ∈ {2, 3}. The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider help2(Qq) only.
Let z ∈ Zn/22 . Consider the i-th query (Ki, xi, yi). This query makes equation (xi ⊕ yi)l = z satisfied
with probability at most 2
n/2
2n−q . More than t2 queries result in a solution with probability at most(
q
t2
) (
2n/2
2n−q
)t2 ≤ ( eq2n/2t2(2n−q))t2 , where we use Stirling’s approximation (t! ≥ (t/e)t for any t). Considering
any possible choice for z, we obtain for k = 2, 3:
Pr (helpk(Qq)) ≤ 2n/2
(
eq2n/2
t2(2n − q)
)t2
. (16)
help4(Qq). A similar analysis as for help2(Qq) results in the following bound:
Pr (help4(Qq)) ≤ 2n
(
eq
t3(2n − q)
)t3
. (17)
The claim is obtained by adding (15-17).
B Appendix to Sect. 4.1: Proofs of Lems. 9-10
B.1 Proof of Lem. 9
We consider the probability of the adversary finding a solution to configuration pre(Qq) of Fig. 7, in
such a way that Qq satisfies ¬help(Qq). For a set of solutions complying with configuration pre(Qq), it
may be the case that two queries are the same or belong to the same super query. We call a (normal or
super) query winning if it makes the configuration satisfied for any other queries in the query history
strictly before this winning query is made. We make the following distinction:
1. The winning query contributes to exactly one position of configuration pre(Qq);
2. The winning query contributes to exactly two positions of configuration pre(Qq);
3. The winning query contributes to exactly three positions of configuration pre(Qq).
Note that a winning query cannot occur at all four positions: if this would be the case, we would have
A = B and thus Y = Z. In particular in the remainder of the proof we will use that a winning normal
query cannot occur at positions (bl, br), and a winning query (normal or super) cannot contribute at
positions (tl, tr).
Case 1. In this case, the winning query may be a normal query or a super query. As in [19, 21],
we make use of “wish lists” for the analysis of this case. Intuitively, a wish list is a continuously
updated sequence of query tuples that would make configuration pre(Q) satisfied. During the attack
of the adversary, we maintain four initially empty wish lists Wtl, Wtr, Wbl, Wbr, corresponding to the
four positions of configuration pre(Q). If a query is made, the wish lists are updated according to the
following requirements:
– If the query fits pretl(Q) of Fig. 12 for any two other queries in the query history, the corresponding
tuple (A,C, (W‖X)⊕ C) is added to Wtl;
– If the query fits pretr(Q) of Fig. 12 for any two other queries in the query history, the corresponding
tuple (B,C, (W‖X)⊕ C) is added to Wtr;
– If the query fits prebl(Q) of Fig. 12 for any two other queries in the query history, the corresponding
tuple (W‖X,A, Y ⊕A) is added to Wbl;
– If the query fits prebr(Q) of Fig. 12 for any two other queries in the query history, the corresponding
tuple (W‖X,B,Z ⊕B) is added to Wbr.
2 preQtl
A
B
C
W X
Y Z
3 preQtr
A
B
C
W X
Y Z
4 preQbl
A B
C
W X
Z
5 preQbr
A B
C
W X
Y
Fig. 12. From left to right: configurations pretl(Q), pretr(Q), prebl(Q), and prebr(Q).
As in this case we consider the winning query to be different from all other queries made before, we
can assume a query never adds itself to a wish list. It is clear that the adversary finds a preimage for
MDC-4 (in this case) only if it makes a query that is already a member of any of the wish lists. Suppose
the adversary makes a query E(K,x) (either as a normal query or as a part of a super query), and
suppose (K,x, y) ∈ Wtl ∪ Wbr for some y. Then, we say that (K,x, y) is wished for, and the wish is
granted if the response of the block cipher is y. Similar naming is used for inverse queries to E. Notice
that the adversary may wish for multiple queries at the same time, but this does not invalidate the
analysis. Additionally, each wish list element can be wished for only once. In order to find a preimage,
the adversary needs at least a wish to be granted. Let (K,x, y) be an element in any of the wish lists,
and suppose the adversary makes a query E(K,x) or E−1(K, y). In case of normal queries, the answer
is generated from a set of size at least 2n−1, and the wish is granted with probability at most 1
2n−1 . In
case the query is a part of a super query, the answer is generated from a set of size exactly 2n−1 and
the wish is also granted with probability at most 1
2n−1 . Because each element of the wish lists can be
wished for only once, the adversary finds a preimage with probability at most
|Wtl|+ |Wtr|+ |Wbl|+ |Wbr|
2n−1
.
It remains to bound the sizes of the wish lists after q queries. Configuration pretl(Qq) of Fig. 12 has ≤ t2
solutions for each bl and br (by ¬help3(Qq)), and consequently ≤ t2 solutions for tr (by ¬help3(Qq)).
Thus |Wtl| ≤ t32, and similarly we obtain |Wtr| ≤ t32. Configuration prebl(Qq) of Fig. 12 has ≤ t2 solutions
for br (by ¬help3(Qq)), and consequently ≤ t1 solutions for tl (by ¬help1(Qq)). For any of these ≤ t1t2
choices, the query at position tr is uniquely determined (if it exists at all). Thus |Wbl| ≤ t1t2, and
similarly |Wbr| ≤ t1t2 (using ¬help2(Qq)). Hence, in this case a preimage is found with probability at
most
4t32+4t1t2
2n .
Case 2. We make the following distinction, and consider the two sub-cases separately.
1. The contributed queries are different for both positions;
2. The contributed queries are the same for both positions.
Case 2.1. In this particular case, the winning query must be a super query. Similar to case 1, we
make use of wish lists, but now for the specific case that a super query contributes two queries to a
configuration. As a super query cannot contribute to (tl, tr), it can only contribute to positions (tl, br),
(tr, bl), (tl, bl), (tr, br), or (bl, br). Note that if a super query contributes to positions (tl, br), the left
half of the XOR-output of tl should equal the left half of the key input to br, which is the same as the
key input to tl (similar for super queries contributing to (tr, bl)). Note that if a super query contributes
to positions (tl, bl), the key input to bl equals the key input to tl which equals the message input to
bl (similar for super queries contributing to (tr, br)). Also, note that if a super query contributes to
positions (bl, br), the XOR-outputs of tl and tr must be the same. During the attack of the adversary,
we maintain five initially empty wish lists W1, . . . ,W5, corresponding to above cases. If a query is made
by the adversary, the wish lists are updated according to the following requirements:
– If the query fits pre1(Q) of Fig. 13 for any query in the query history, the corresponding tuple
(V ‖X,C, (V ‖W )⊕ C,B,Z ⊕B) is added to W1;
– If the query fits pre2(Q) of Fig. 13 for any query in the query history, the corresponding tuple
(V ‖X,C, (V ‖W )⊕ C,A, Y ⊕A) is added to W2;
– If the query fits pre3(Q) of Fig. 13 for any query in the query history, the corresponding tuple
(X‖W,C, (V ‖W )⊕ C,X‖W,Y ⊕ (X‖W )) is added to W3;
– If the query fits pre4(Q) of Fig. 13 for any query in the query history, the corresponding tuple
(X‖W,C, (V ‖W )⊕ C,X‖W,Z ⊕ (X‖W )) is added to W4;
– If the query fits pre5(Q) of Fig. 13 for any query in the query history, the corresponding tuple
(W‖X,A, Y ⊕A,B,Z ⊕B) is added to W5.
Of these tuples, the first element identifies the key for which the super query is made, the second and
third element define the input and output of the cipher in the top row (either left or right), and the
fourth and fifth element define the input and output of the cipher in the bottom row (either right or
left). For W5, the second and third element correspond to bl and the fourth and fifth element to br. A
query trivially does not add itself to the wish list (as these cases would be covered by Case 3). Suppose
the adversary makes a super query to E for key K, and suppose (K,xtl, ytl, xbr, ybr) ∈ W1 for some
xtl, ytl, xbr, ybr. This wish is then granted if the response satisfies ytl = E(K,xtl) and ybr = E(K,xbr). In
order to find a preimage, the adversary needs at least a wish to be granted. As the answers are generated
from a set of size exactly 2n−1, a wish is granted with probability at most 1
2n−1(2n−1−1) . Because each
element of the wish lists can be wished for only once, the adversary finds a preimage with probability
at most
|W1|+ |W2|+ |W3|+ |W4|+ |W5|
2n−1(2n−1 − 1) .
It remains to bound the sizes of the wish lists after q queries. Configuration pre1(Qq) has ≤ t2 solutions
for bl (by ¬help3(Qq)), and at most ≤ t1 solutions for tr (by ¬help1(Qq)). Thus, |W1| ≤ t1t2 and similarly
|W2| ≤ t1t2. Configuration pre3(Qq) has ≤ t2 solutions for br (by ¬help3(Qq)), and at most ≤ t1 solutions
for tr (by ¬help2(Qq)). Additionally, there are 2n/2 possibilities forW . Thus |W3| ≤ t1t22n/2 and similarly
|W4| ≤ t1t22n/2. Configuration pre5(Qq) has 2n/2 choices for W , for any of these choices it has ≤ t1
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Fig. 13. From left to right: configurations pre1(Q), . . . , pre5(Q).
solutions for tr (by ¬help1(Qq)), and consequently ≤ t2 solutions for tl (by ¬help3(Qq)). Thus also
|W5| ≤ t1t22n/2. Hence, in this case a preimage is found with probability at most 16t1t2+24t1t22n/222n .
Case 2.2. In this case, the winning query may be a normal query or a super query. The winning query
can only contribute to positions (tl = br), (tr = bl), (tl = bl), or (tr = br).
We first consider the winning query to contribute to tl = br. Suppose the adversary makes a query
y ← E(K,x) (either as a normal query or as a part of a super query). As it occurs at position br we
require x ⊕ y = Z (because of this, the analysis for inverse queries is equivalent). Additionally, the
query at position tr should have key input as well as message input equal to x. This particularly means
that the key input K to tl = br must satisfy K = Z l‖(E(x, x) ⊕ x)r. By construction of the queries at
positions bl, br, the adversary can only succeed if it ever finds an x ∈ Zn2 that satisfies
E((E(x, x)⊕ x)l‖Zr, Z l‖(E(x, x)⊕ x)r)⊕ Z l‖(E(x, x)⊕ x)r = Y,
E(Z l‖(E(x, x)⊕ x)r, x)⊕ x = Z.
As Y and Z are fixed, the adversary finds such x with probability at most 2
n
2n−12n−1 =
4
2n . The same
probability bound is obtained for winning queries to appear at (tr, bl).
Consider a query contributing to tl = bl. By construction, this query must be of the form E(K,K) = y
where K ⊕ y = Y and Kr = Y r. As Y is fixed, the adversary finds such query with probability at most
2n/2
2n−1 =
2·2n/2
2n (either in case of forward or inverse query). The same probability bound is obtained for
winning queries to appear at (tr, br).
Consequently, a preimage is found in this case with probability at most 8+4·2
n/2
2n .
Case 3. Recall that a query can never contribute to (tl, tr) at the same time. Therefore, we only need
to consider queries contributing at positions (tl, bl, br) or (tr, bl, br). We make the following distinction,
and consider the two sub-cases separately.
1. The contributed queries are different for all positions;
2. The contributed queries are the same at two positions.
Note that as the queries at (bl, br) cannot be the same, there is no need to consider the case all three
queries are the same.
Case 3.1. As before, we consider two wish lists Wtl, Wtr, corresponding to position to which the
winning query does not contribute. Note that if a super query contributes to positions (tr, bl, br), the
XOR-outputs of tl and tr must be the same, and equal to the key input to tr. In order words, any query
to tl fixes exactly one wish list tuple in Wtl. In more detail, if a query E(K,x) = y is made the wish
lists are updated as follows:
– The tuple (x⊕ y, x, y,K, Y ⊕K,x⊕ y, Z ⊕ x⊕ y) is added to Wtl;
– The tuple (x⊕ y, x, y, x⊕ y, Y ⊕ x⊕ y,K,Z ⊕K) is added to Wtr.
Of these tuples, the first element identifies the key, the second and third element define the input and
output of the cipher in the top row (either left or right), the fourth and fifth element define the input
and output of the cipher at bl and the sixth and seventh element the input and output of the cipher at
br. Because each element of the wish lists can be wished for only once, the adversary finds a preimage
with probability at most
|Wtl|+ |Wtr|
2n−1(2n−1 − 1)(2n−1 − 2) .
Clearly, |Wtl|, |Wtr| ≤ q. Hence, in this case a preimage is found with probability at most 64q23n .
Case 3.2. Note that the same query can only occur at positions (tl = br), (tr = bl), (tl = bl), or (tr = br).
The analysis of case 2.2 carries over directly, but for the latter two scenarios we can do better. Consider
a query contributing to tl = bl. Note that, as the super query also contributes to position br, the key
inputs to tl, bl, br are the same. By construction, the query at tl = bl must be of the form E(K,K) = y
where K ⊕ y = Y and K = Y . As Y is fixed, the adversary finds such query with probability at most
1
2n−1 =
2
2n (either in case of forward or inverse query). The same probability bound is obtained for
winning queries to appear at (tr = br). Consequently, a preimage is found in this case with probability
at most 122n .
The claim is obtained by summing the bounds obtained for the three cases.
B.2 Proof of Lem. 10
It suffices to consider the events Pr (helpk(Qq)) (k = 1, 2, 3) separately.
helpk(Qq) for k ∈ {1, 2}. The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider help1(Qq) only. Let
z ∈ Zn/22 . Denote by Q(n)q the restriction of Qq to normal queries, and by Q(s)q the restriction of Qq to
queries that belong to super queries. In order for Qq to have more than t1 solutions to (xi⊕ yi)l = z, at
least one of the following criteria needs to hold:
1. Q(n)q has more than t1/2 solutions;
2. Q(s)q has more than t1/2 solutions.
We consider these two scenarios separately. In case of normal queries, each query (Ki, xi, yi) is answered
with a value generated at random from a set of size at least 2n−1, and hence it satisfies (xi ⊕ yi)l = z
with probability at most 2
n/2
2n−1 =
2
2n/2
. More than t1/2 queries result in a solution with probability at
most
( q
t1/2
) (
2
2n/2
)t1/2 ≤ ( 4eq
t12n/2
)t1/2
.
The analysis for super queries is more elaborate. In order for Q(s)q to have more than t1/2 solutions,
as at most q/2n−1 super queries occur, at least one of the super queries needs to provide more than
t′1 :=
t1
2q/2n−1 =
t12n
4q solutions. Consider any super query, consisting of 2
n−1 queries. It provides more
than t′1 solutions with probability at most(
2n−1
t′1
) t′1−1∏
j=0
2n/2
2n−1 − j ≤
(
2n−1
t′1
)(
2n/2
2n−1 − t′1
)t′1
≤
(
e2n−12n/2
t′1(2n−1 − t′1)
)t′1
.
Provided t1 ≤ q, we have t′1 = t12
n
4q ≤ 2n−2, and thus 12n−1−t′1 ≤
1
2n−2 . Consequently, this super query
adds more than t12
n
4q solutions with probability at most
(
8eq
t12n/2
) t12n
4q
. In order to cover any super query,
we need to multiply this probability with q/2n−1.
Considering any possibly choice for z, we obtain for k = 1, 2:
Pr (helpk(Qq)) ≤ 2n/2
(
4eq
t12n/2
)t1/2
+ 2n/2 · q
2n−1
(
8eq
t12n/2
) t12n
4q
. (18)
help3(Qq). A similar analysis as for help1(Qq) results in the following bound:
Pr (help3(Qq)) ≤ 2n
(
4eq
t22n
)t2/2
+ 2n · q
2n−1
(
8eq
t22n
) t22n
4q
. (19)
The claim is obtained by adding (18) (twice) and (19).
